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ABSTRACT
Behavioural economics provides a more realistic model of man than
neoclassical economics. But ‘behavioural economic man’ likewise has his
shortcomings. An important aspect is the neglect of social contingency.
This article sheds light on the conceptions of the ‘social’ invoked in
diﬀerent strands of behavioural economics and explores their policy
implications. Based on diﬀerent interpretations of the rational choice
paradigm and deviations thereof, a distinction is drawn between
mainstream approaches and alternative approaches to behavioural
economics and within ‘mainstream behavioural economics’ between its
cognitive and its social strand. Whereas the cognitive strand of
behavioural economics has quite a limited understanding of the social,
which yields a narrow form of behavioural politics, the social strand
oﬀers a richer account of social variability and dynamics, which in
principle leaves more room for politics. However, both approaches lay
emphasis on our human nature rather than the speciﬁcities of modern
culture.
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1. Introduction: probing understandings of the ‘social’ within behavioural
economics
A central tenet of behavioural economics is that it is more ‘realistic’ than the neoclassical economic
mainstream. What this greater realism consists in can be condensed as follows. Whereas neoclassical
economists take rational choice as axiomatically given, without necessarily interpreting this as a prop-
erty of individual economic actors, behavioural economists seek to provide a psychologically more
accurate account of economic decision-making. In other words, they aim to replace the analytical
ﬁction of homo economicus with empirical ﬁndings about the decision-making of ‘real human
beings’.
To develop more realistic models of economic decision-making, behavioural economics can,
in principle, import wisdom from across the behavioural and social sciences – from biology to
sociology. In practice, it combines economic theory ﬁrst of all with insights from cognitive
psychology. As a consequence of this selectivity in borrowing from other disciplines, behav-
ioural economics is characterised by a truncated understanding of the social. Behaviours
that may look ineﬃcient from an economic point of view are attributed to individuals
rather than institutions and explained in terms of human evolution rather than modern
culture. This leads to an underestimation of social contingency, which may have conservative
policy implications.
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This article has a twofold aim. On the one hand, it seeks to understand the turn to ‘behavioural
economic man’ in the larger context of developing homo economicus as a model of man and the
rational choice approach as a unifying perspective in the social sciences (section 2).
For this purpose, the article brieﬂy recounts the history of economic man in the economic disci-
pline and, thereafter, expounds two intersecting projects in making economic man more realistic:
‘mainstreaming behavioural economics’ (section 2.1) and ‘generalising the rational choice approach’
(section 2.2).
Both are interdisciplinary projects, but they take diﬀerent directions. The ﬁrst project aims to open
economics to the behavioural sciences and make use of behavioural experiments to improve core
economic models. To structure this expanding ﬁeld of scholarship, the article distinguishes
between alternative and mainstream behavioural economics and within mainstream behavioural
economics between its cognitive and social strand. The second project aims to promote the rational
choice approach as a general theoretical framework and ‘unifying’ perspective across the social
sciences. By reconstructing the development of the rational choice approach outside the economic
discipline, it will be demonstrated how this project converges with but also complements key devel-
opments in behavioural economics. Taking both projects together gives a better understanding of
the range of positions, which is available to create more realistic models of economic man: from a
narrow understanding of bounded rationality to broader understandings of ecological and social
rationality.
On the other hand, this article aims to shed light on the conceptions of the ‘social’ that are invoked
or implied in behavioural economics and explore their policy implications, focusing on the cognitive
strand and the social strand of mainstream behavioural economics (section 3).
To set the framework, the article brieﬂy turns to the normative function of the rational choice
approach and introduces the problem of the ‘social’ in the behavioural sciences in general terms. Sub-
sequently, it exposes the limits of behavioural economists’ understanding of the social both in the
cognitive strand (section 3.1) and the social strand (section 3.2), including related policy applications.
What both strands of mainstream behavioural economics share is that they deﬁne the ‘bounds of
human nature’ in terms that may lead to overemphasise behavioural invariants and neglect the con-
tingency of social action. As a result, politics may be narrowed down to behavioural interventions in
given institutional settings without any space for alternatives. The diﬀerence between the two
strands is that the cognitive strand, which focuses on the cognitive biases in individual decision-
making, reduces the social to context eﬀects in the moment of decision-making, whereas the
social strand, which is concerned with constellations of strategic interaction between two or more
individuals, also allows for longer-term social inﬂuences which may shape individual preferences
and identities. What emerges from the discussion is a map of ‘bounded sociality’ in behavioural econ-
omics, which illustrates the main roads taken but also points to the vast territory left aside.
2. Through thick and thin: the passages of homo economicus
Homo economicus has a long pedigree in economic thought. However, the substance of this concept
has considerably changed over time. Overall, one can speak of a move from a relatively ‘thick’ or rea-
listic description of economic man to much ‘thinner’ and more formalistic notions of the economic
agent. In a nutshell, this meant stripping homo economicus oﬀ all his psychology. The recent rise
of behavioural economics seems to mark a turning point in this development. At the same time,
economic man’s journey through other social scientiﬁc disciplines has changed his character. In
this section, we will explore how the projects of mainstreaming behavioural economics and general-
ising the rational choice approach complement each other in making the model of economic man
more ‘realistic’. However, before turning to these academic movements, we will brieﬂy sum up the
evolution of homo economicus in his homeland.
The history of ‘economic man’ as a reference point for economic theorising spans over two
hundred years from early classical to contemporary neoclassical economics. Over time, the core
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features of this model have become increasingly generalised, idealised and abstract. Adam Smith’
picture of economic man was still much richer in detail than contemporary notions (Morgan, 2006,
pp. 2–4). It does highlight economic self-interest but along with other characteristics, such as diﬀer-
ences in talent and the willingness to exchange and invest, which together further the division of
labour and, ultimately, spur economic growth. Moreover, Smith’ economic man does not simply rep-
resent reality but also fulﬁls a normative function, lending credibility to the ‘doux-commerce thesis’
which became prominent in eighteenth-century moral philosophy (Hirschman, 1982, pp. 1464–1466).
In contrast, John Stuart Mill’s homo economicus was not meant to represent man as a whole but to
focus on what mattered most from a theoretical point of view: his wealth-seeking behaviour (Morgan,
2006, pp. 4–6). This yields a relatively narrow concept of economic man, which is obviously less rea-
listic. Another important step was made by William Stanley Jevons, whose main concern was with the
utility of consumption. Drawing on the pleasure-and-pain principle, his model of man was inspired by
‘hedonic psychology’ (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012, p. 645) but its impetus was mathematical. The
economic actor is depicted as ‘calculating man’ who compares the utility gains of diﬀerent consump-
tion options in order to maximise his utility (Morgan, 2006, pp. 10–13). In these ‘utilitarian’ models of
man, economic self-interest is the deﬁning, if not exclusive feature.
In the early twentieth century, economic man was equipped with characteristics that further
detached him from reality, such as full information, perfect foresight, and independence from
others (Morgan, 2006, pp. 14–16). These features were introduced to facilitate mathematical model-
ling, and not to capture any properties of real human beings. However, rationality could still be under-
stood in terms of the maximisation of self-interest. In the mid-twentieth century, yet another
abstraction took place: the constitutive feature of economic man was now seen in the consistency
of choice given a set of alternatives (Morgan, 2006, pp. 18–21). Ultimately, then, we can speak of a
shift from the relatively narrow maximisation approach, which still supposes a rational self-interest,
to the wider consistency approach, which does not make any reference to human psychology
(Giocoli, 2005).
Outside the neoclassical framework, there is a greater tendency to take homo economicus for
real, that is, to commit the ‘fallacy of misplaced concreteness’. Indeed, many critics of the rational
choice approach seem to confound the neoclassical construction of the economic agent with a
descriptive account of individual decision-making (Ross, 2012). Given the technicalities of the ‘micro-
foundation’ of neoclassical economic theory, the frequency of this category error may not be surpris-
ing. More curious, perhaps, is that even among experts the debate about making economic models
more realistic often centres around ‘paleo-homo economicus’ (Doucouliagos, 1994, p. 878), a narrow
model of economic man as a rational egoist, and not on the state of the art of the consistency
approach. But, in practice, neoclassical models often do include (auxiliary) assumptions of perfect
knowledge and self-interest. The aim of the debate can then be boiled down to exchanging one
‘thick’ description for another to create a more realistic looking ‘neo-homo economicus’ (Doucoulia-
gos, 1994, p. 881). In the following, we will analyse the two academic movements engaged in this
venture – behavioural economics and rational choice theory – with regard to their conceptions of
rationality.
2.1. Model-building in a world of bounded rationality: mainstreaming behavioural
economics
If neoclassical economics is based on the premise of rational choice, or utility maximisation, in what
way is this premise modiﬁed or replaced by behavioural economics? A simple answer seems to be
that behavioural economics diﬀers from neoclassical economics by turning from ‘full rationality’ to
‘bounded rationality’ (Heukelom, 2014, p. 172). However, the debate is complicated by the fact
that there are diﬀerent notions of rationality in standard economics, which do not necessarily
exclude bounded rationality, and that there are diﬀerent understandings of bounded rationality in
behavioural economics. While it would be more accurate to consider research on bounded rationality
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a subﬁeld of behavioural economics (Mallard, 2016, p. 6), the terminology remains ambiguous even
then (Cartwright, 2011, p. 10).
Overviews of the state-of-the-art in behavioural economics usually provide a list of theoretical and
empirical contributions to various areas of research, without giving much attention to the systema-
tisation of diﬀerent approaches (Cartwright, 2011, p. 10). To give an example, Dhami’s (2016) compre-
hensive textbook covers behavioural approaches to judgment, decision-making, other-regarding
preferences, time-discounting, learning, and emotions.
Altman (2017, p. 181) ﬁnds the ‘diﬀerent faces of behavioural economics’ reﬂected in the
‘bounded-rationality approach’ on the one hand and the ‘heuristics-and-biases approach’ on the
other. This distinction resonates with comparisons between ‘old’ and ‘new’ behavioural economics
(Angner & Loewenstein, 2012). The older bounded-rationality approach goes back to Herbert
Simon (1978), but variants of this agenda can also be found in contemporary scholarship (Gigerenzer,
2016). The somewhat newer heuristics-and-biases approach is based on the work of Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky (Kahneman, 2003), which was constitutive for ‘building and deﬁning’
today’s mainstream behavioural economics (Heukelom, 2014, chapter 6).
Whereas the heuristics-and-biases approach describes a speciﬁc research programme in behav-
ioural economics, the concept of bounded rationality is sometimes used as a marker for the ﬁeld
as a whole. As a case in point, Kahneman depicts his joint work with Tversky as an attempt to
provide ‘a map of bounded rationality’ (Kahneman, 2003, p. 1449). For Gigerenzer (2016, p. 56,
note 2), whose work builds on old behavioural economics, such nods to Simon’s work in the realm
of new behavioural economics are no more than an ‘afterthought’. With regard to neoclassical econ-
omics, the bounded-rationality approach and the heuristics-and-biases approach follow quite
diﬀerent paths: of disunity in the former case and rapprochement in the latter.
This duality of approaches may be useful to gain a ﬁrst orientation in behavioural economics, but it
leaves out an important part of the ﬁeld, which is concerned with social preferences. In the remainder
of this subsection, we will therefore develop an alternative approach to structure the ﬁeld starting
from the diﬀerent notions and ‘layers’ of rationality that are invoked in neoclassical and behavioural
economics. This helps to clarify in what way, or under what premises, the ‘social’ may come into play
in behavioural economics, and thus lays the foundations for the following argument.
Practically speaking, the lowest common denominator of neoclassical and behavioural economics
seems to be in some notion of ‘instrumental rationality’, which corresponds to an ‘intentional’ reading
of the consistency approach (Blume & Easley, 2018). In the broader range of social science theories,
this already presumes a focus on ‘agency’ instead of ‘structure’ (Walsh, 1998) and, within theories of
(social) action, a focus on instrumentally rational action instead of other ‘ideal-types’, such as action
motivated by norms, values or emotions (Weber, 1978). These broader rationalities are emphasised in
the interdisciplinary ﬁeld of socioeconomics (Etzioni, 2006) and partly also in sociological rational
choice theory (Lindenberg, 2006).
For the distinction between neoclassical and behavioural economics, and the relation of behav-
iourally-informed approaches to mainstream economics, the next step is important: whether utility
maximisation is still assumed as the best way to approximate (average or aggregate) empirical behav-
iour or whether alternative modelling strategies are preferred, which may include other quantiﬁable
mechanisms as well as more qualitative accounts of instrumentally rational action. One straightfor-
ward distinction on this level is to contrast neoclassical models of utility maximisation with behav-
ioural models of bounded rationality (Harstad & Selten, 2013). Indeed, the concept of bounded
rationality was originally introduced as an alternative to modelling decision-making processes in
terms of utility maximisation, since the cognitive requirements of the latter seemed unrealistic
(Simon, 2018). However, a prominent strategy in contemporary scholarship seems to be to introduce
aspects of bounded rationality into a model of utility maximisation (Rabin, 2013). Within behavioural
economics, such ‘optimisation-based models’ aim to improve existing neoclassical models (Crawford,
2013), which would ultimately make the distinction between neoclassical and behavioural economics
obsolete.
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Along similar lines, Dhami’s (2016, p. 2) deﬁnition of behavioural economics includes ‘[a]ny falsiﬁ-
able theory that replaces/modiﬁes any of the core features of neoclassical economics, by alternatives
that have a better empirical foundation in human behaviour’. Consequently, behavioural econ-
omics is depicted as an ‘enhancement’ of neoclassical economics, and not as its ‘antithesis’
(Dhami, 2016, p. 2). We will refer to scholarship that is closely oriented towards neoclassical econ-
omics as ‘mainstream approaches to behavioural economics’ and to scholarship that is more criti-
cal with regard to neoclassical models of utility maximisation as ‘alternative approaches to
behavioural economics’.
But even if utility maximisation is, in principle, taken as given, rationality can still be spelled out in
diﬀerent ways, imposing self-interest and/or full rationality. In response to these ‘unrealistic’ claims,
which form part of the ‘typical practice of neoclassical economics’ (Dhami, 2016, p. 1; emphasis
omitted), one can distinguish between two strands of (mainstream) behavioural economics that
aim to modify diﬀerent variables entering the hypothetical utility function. One strand mainly
takes issue with (substantive) speciﬁcations of the rationality principle in terms of correct beliefs
about the world and consistent choice between available alternatives. These assumptions are
modiﬁed to account for cognitive illusions and context eﬀects, which include common judgement
errors (e.g. Mullainathan, 2002; Rabin, 2002) as well as situation- and time-dependent preferences
(e.g. Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). The other strand distances itself
from the axiom of self-interest in the maximisation approach, which is still a default in many neoclas-
sical models, and emphasises social preferences instead (e.g. Falk & Fischbacher, 2006; Fehr &
Schmidt, 1999). Relatedly, the assumption of exogenous preferences is modiﬁed to include endogen-
ous preferences acquired by way of social learning (e.g. Bowles, 1998; Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016). Following
Zarri’s (2010) related distinction, we will refer to these divergent approaches as the ‘cognitive’ and the
‘social’ strand, or component, of behavioural economics.1 (Figure 1 summarises the suggested classiﬁ-
cation of approaches.)
2.2. Between rational egoism and social rationality:2 generalising the rational choice
approach
Inasmuch as behavioural economics argues within the conﬁnes of the rational choice approach, it
also relates to the project to generalise the rational choice approach from economics to other
social scientiﬁc disciplines. This subsection is interested in how empirical applications of the rational
choice approach outside economics proper may have come to be reﬂected in theory-building by
moving beyond both the narrowly conﬁned maximisation approach and the substantively empty
consistency approach.
As before, we will focus on how rational choice is spelled out on diﬀerent analytical levels, namely
with regard to the principles of (1) utility maximisation, (2) self-interest, and (3) rationality (here
understood in a narrow, cognitive sense). The following presentation does not aim to give a compre-
hensive account of generalised rational choice theory but draws on representative contributions to
underpin the overall argument.
Figure 1. Diﬀerent strands of behavioural economics related to the rational choice approach. Source: Author’s own.
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A good starting point is Gary Becker’s ‘economic approach to human behaviour’, which rests on
‘[t]he combined assumptions of maximising behaviour, market equilibrium, and stable preferences’
(Becker, 1976, p. 5), but does not hinge on ‘narrow assumptions about self interest’ (Becker, 1993,
p. 385). The principle of utility maximisation allows including one’s own valuation of others’ out-
comes, even though the perspective is necessarily self-centred in terms of whose utility function it
is. Markets can exist or emerge anywhere, which includes ‘social markets’, such as the marriage
market, the market for criminal oﬀences, or the market for intellectual ideas. All of these could be
analysed according to the logic of demand and supply, which aﬀects the ‘price’ of certain behaviours.
If preferences are considered to be ﬁxed, a change in behaviour can unambiguously be attributed to
a change in restrictions (such as in market prices, individual budget or legal framework). Overall,
Becker seems not much concerned with the realism of his assumptions. His ‘thin’ notion of rationality
is in line with the consistency approach. In this overview, his work is representative of generalising the
rational choice approach by substantively broadening its area of application.
A key reference in sociological rational choice theory (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997) is the work of
James Coleman, whose ambition was to replace homo sociologicus with homo economicus as the
reference point of sociological theory-building. Whereas the classical homo sociologicus depicts a
socialised individual whose main driving force is to act in conformity with social norms, Coleman
(1964, p. 167) starts ‘with an image of man as wholly free: unsocialised, entirely self-interested, not
constrained by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to further his own interest’. In con-
trast to Becker, he explicitly takes ‘selﬁsh interests’ as a starting point to theorise about questions of
social order, such as the emergence of social norms (Coleman, 1990, p. 31). Analytically speaking,
Coleman’s notion of rationality is in line with the maximisation approach, which includes the (auxili-
ary) assumption that ‘[a]ctors are optimally informed rational egoists who care only for the tangible
consequences of their actions’ (Kroneberg & Kalter, 2012, p. 81). What is new compared to the neo-
classical version of this approach is that the self-interest assumption is no longer conﬁned to econ-
omic action, namely market behaviour, but substantively broadened to explain fundamental social
dynamics.
However, in order to understand the development of generalised rational choice theory, it does
not suﬃce to distinguish between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ conceptions of rationality, but one also has to
make a diﬀerence between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ conceptions of thick rationality. As a pioneer in
this respect, Jon Elster (1983) contrasted ‘thin’ and ‘broad’ theories of rationality. Here, the ‘thin’
understanding of rational action is equated with the consistency approach and distinguished from
a ‘thicker’ understanding of economic man as basically selﬁsh (Elster, 1983, p. 10). In contrast to
both, the ‘broad’ theory strives for a more substantive understanding of rationality in terms of the
formation of reasonable beliefs and preferences, which can be deﬁned as free from cognitive
biases and conformist adaptation (Elster, 1983, pp. 15–26). Like Becker and Coleman, Elster
extends rational choice theory into new areas of application, such as politics. However, he does
not do so by postulating utility maximisation as a one-size-ﬁts-all mechanism to explain human
behaviour or by reconstructing the foundations of society in terms of individual self-interest, but
by emphasising the material conditions of ‘true’ rationality. In his broad version of rational choice,
the rationality principle is substantively reinforced.
Whereas the above extensions of the rational choice approach cannot easily be aligned with the
advance of behavioural economics, the picture changes with the following adaptations. One strategy
has been to relax restrictive assumptions about ‘optimally informed rational egoists’who know every-
thing and only care about themselves, and embrace the principles of bounded rationality and
bounded self-interest instead. This basically means replacing the maximisation approach with
another thick description. Another strategy is to ‘[go] beyond explaining behaviour solely in terms
of maximising expected utility’ and integrate alternative theoretical perspectives (Kroneberg &
Kalter, 2012, p. 83). Utility maximisation is then no longer regarded as ‘the’ unifying approach.
The ﬁrst strategy is evident in Gebhard Kirchgässner’s (2008) ‘economic model of behaviour’,
which diﬀers from Becker’s original version in that it has already internalised substantive criticisms
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from outside the economic discipline. The two central assumptions are still considered to be self-
interest and rationality, but both are substantively qualiﬁed. Kirchgässner (2008, p. 15) concedes
that the ‘“axiom [of self-interest]” is in fact an empirical assumption that in special situations has
to be checked, modiﬁed or even rejected’. And he only invokes a ‘weak principle of rationality’,
which seems general enough to include aspects of bounded rationality and rule-following behaviour
(Kirchgässner, 2008, pp. 25–33).
Another example of this strategy is Karl-Dieter Opp’s (2013) approach, which models social norms
as ‘incentives’ that motivate utility-maximising individuals to comply. In contrast to Coleman, who
addressed similar questions, Opp adopts a wider version of rational choice theory, which substan-
tively qualiﬁes the assumption of self-interest. His model includes not only ‘external outcomes’,
such as material beneﬁts or social approval, but also ‘internal outcomes’, such as ‘internal satisfaction
if a goal is realised’ (Opp, 2013, p. 388). This is based on the premise that social norms can be inter-
nalised and turn into personal goals, achievement of which yields intrinsic beneﬁts (Opp, 2013,
pp. 398–402). Once this happens, there is no conﬂict between following norms and maximising
one’s utility anymore.
The second strategy, which takes the rational choice approach to its limits, is exempliﬁed by the
work of Siegwart Lindenberg (1990), whose ‘general model of man in the social sciences’, or socio-
economic man, eventually became so general that utility maximisation got too narrow as a
concept. Originally, the acronym RREEMM stood for ‘resourceful, restricted, expecting, evaluating,
maximising man’ (Lindenberg, 1990, p. 739). More recently, Lindenberg (2000, p. 636, note 1)
replaced ‘maximisation’ with ‘motivation’, because the former was ‘too much associated’ with the
maximisation approach. Moreover, he added ‘meaning’ as a sixth substantive element, which high-
lights that all social action is premised on the deﬁnition (or ‘framing’) of situations (Lindenberg, 2000,
pp. 652–654). In terms of ‘master frames’, which can be switched between roles and situations, the
‘gain frame’ of maximising income now stands next to other frames, such as the ‘hedonic frame’
of seeking comfort and the ‘normative frame’ of acting appropriately (Lindenberg, 2000, pp. 654–
663).
These three approaches are representative of a generation of scholarship that modiﬁes rational
choice theory in line with the concerns of behavioural economists. It can be argued that such sub-
stantively enriched approaches, which qualify the assumptions of rationality and self-interest and
even relativise the principle of utility maximisation, are indeed more ‘realistic’ in that they are
more attuned to diﬀerent empirical settings than the narrow maximisation approach and the
empty consistency approach. However, the context dependency of rational (social) action also trans-
lates into a contingency of model speciﬁcation (Kroneberg & Kalter, 2012, pp. 81–87). And, in the end,
one might not even see a need to subsume everything under ‘rational choice’ anymore (Hedström &
Ylikoski, 2014, p. 60).
3. Behavioural politics: deﬁning the bounds of human nature3
Above we distinguished mainstream approaches from alternative approaches to behavioural econ-
omics and, within mainstream behavioural economics, between the cognitive strand, which is speciﬁ-
cally interested in modelling bounded rationality, and the social strand, which is particularly
concerned with modelling bounded self-interest. This section will take a closer look at the ‘social
theory’ inherent in behavioural economics and what policy implications this may have (Micklitz,
2018). The main argument is that by deﬁning the ‘bounds of human nature’ (Mullainathan &
Thaler, 2001, p. 1095), behavioural economics furthers a limited understanding of the social, which
also determines the range of behavioural politics.
Before exploring in more detail how behavioural economists represent the social world, it
seems useful to go back to our analytical framework and consider in what way diﬀerent speciﬁca-
tions of the rational choice approach may already preconﬁgure political usages of behavioural
arguments.
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Following Hands (2012, p. 227; emphasis omitted), rational choice theory is ‘neither a positive/
descriptive theory of real economic agents, nor an ethical theory about what such agents ought
to do’. It is based on an axiomatic deﬁnition of what it means to be rational, which is used as ‘as
if’ assumption in empirical applications (Friedman, 1953). However, in practice, the deﬁnition of
what is rational and what is not is suggestive enough to turn into a normative ideal that guides econ-
omic behaviour and also informs economic policy.
This is the case in the cognitive strand, in which the rationality principle is interpreted as a ‘con-
ventional behavioural norm’, deviations from which are conceived as ‘biases’ or ‘errors’ in need of
correction (Altman, 2017, p. 182). In the social strand, the situation is somewhat more ambiguous
since the rationality principle takes a more abstract form, with other-regarding preferences being
per se no less rational than self-regarding preferences. This makes the rationality norm politically
less instructive. As Zarri (2010, p. 566) puts it: ‘insofar as [behavioural economics’] deﬁnition of “ration-
ality” does not get violated, there is no room for paternalism’. At the same time, both approaches
remain in the framework of utility maximisation, which suggests that diﬀerent individual and
social outcomes can be compared and ranked. In contrast, alternative approaches to behavioural
economics take a diﬀerent route. As a case in point, the bounded-rationality approach in the tradition
of Simon starts from a ‘contextualised’ understanding of rationality, which takes individual and insti-
tutional ‘capabilities’ and ‘constraints’ into account (Altman, 2017, pp. 182–186). This does not easily
translate into policy recipes. Constraints may be changed and capabilities improved, but there is no
optimum to strive for (Altman, 2017, pp. 190–191). Individual behaviour and social environments are
regarded as two sides of the same coin, none of which has analytical or normative primacy over the
other.
The following argument focuses on ‘bounded sociality’: the ways in which behavioural econom-
ists’ understanding of the social is analytically truncated and what normative consequences this
may have. To put the problem of the social in more general terms, we can claim that a core interest
in the behavioural sciences is to ﬁnd behavioural regularities that are universal or quasi-universal in
character. In the realm of the human and social sciences, including behavioural economics, this
regards the ‘invariants of human behaviour’ (Simon, 1990). However, such a ‘universalising’ research
interest creates a tension with the principle of social contingency, which anthropologists and sociol-
ogists derive from the study of human culture. If it is true that many behavioural invariants are actu-
ally ‘social invariants’, which are ‘invariant only over a particular society or a particular era, or even
over a particular social or professional group within a society’ (Simon, 1990, p. 16), one has to be cau-
tious with scientiﬁc generalisations (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). This caveat applies even
more so to introducing purported laws of behaviour into politics. Arguably, ‘evidence-based
policy-making’ that reckons with the invariants of human behaviour (Sibony & Alemanno, 2015,
p. 5) leads to diﬀerent policies than emphasising the ‘heterogeneity’, ‘versatility’, and ‘plasticity’ of
people (Bowles & Gintis, 2006, p. 184).
The two strands of mainstream behavioural economics to be discussed next diﬀer in whether the
social is considered an inﬂuence in the moment of decision-making or whether it is considered to be
of more durable inﬂuence (Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016). Whereas the cognitive strand is more concerned
with the immediate context of economic action and relevant social cues, the social strand takes a
longer-term perspective on the social context including aspects of individual and cultural develop-
ment. In behavioural models, this diﬀerence is reﬂected in the distinction between situation-depen-
dent and endogenous preferences (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012, pp. 373–375).
3.1. Quick ﬁxes: the cognitive strand of behavioural economics and its policy implications
The cognitive strand of behavioural economics focuses on biases and errors in individual judgement
and decision-making, which violate the rationality norm and lead to sub-optimal economic out-
comes. It draws on ‘behavioural decision research’, a branch of psychology which emerged in the
1970s and attacked rational choice theory on empirical grounds (Angner & Loewenstein, 2012,
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pp. 660–664). Kahneman and Tversky’s work is rooted in this ﬁeld, which Richard Thaler helped to
popularise in the economic profession. As a result of this ‘boundary work’, behavioural economics
today is closely linked with cognitive psychology. Simply speaking, cognitive psychology is con-
cerned with the workings of our cognitive apparatus, which basically all human beings share. Accord-
ingly, the emphasis of the cognitive strand of behavioural economics is on common mistakes which
individuals make not as members of speciﬁc groups or collectives but as members of the same
species. Indeed, the common denominator in this ﬁeld seems to be that human beings are not
rational by nature but that they are fallible. In Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008, p. 7) words: ‘They are
not homo economicus; they are homo sapiens.’
However, there is no a priori reason to assume that all our cognitive biases are hard-wired (Streeck,
2010). Ghisellini and Chang (2018, pp. 98–101) distinguish between ‘innate’ biases that form part of
the human condition, ‘justiﬁable’ biases that facilitate decision-making under time and information
constraints, and ‘real’ biases. Only the latter would be problematic in an ‘ecological’ understanding
of rationality (Gigerenzer, 2016). Moreover, another implication could be drawn as well: that we
are rational only by culture. In this perspective, rational choice, or utility maximisation, is a cultural
norm. Indeed, the decision-making problems studied in behavioural economics are typically
related to living in a highly rationalised monetary and ﬁnancial culture, in which calculative
agency is key. What empirical ﬁndings suggest is that this rationality norm often goes beyond our
individual cognitive abilities. However, rational behaviour can be institutionally supported. Çalışkan
and Callon (2009, p. 380) speak of ‘socio-cognitive prostheses that enable the (economic) formatting
of individual behaviours’. These span from algorithms in our virtual environment to the material archi-
tecture around us.
If our cognitive capacities are shaped by our culture, this should include our ability to act rationally
as much as our failures to do so. Put diﬀerently, deviations from economic rationality may well be
caused by other rationalities of (social) action, which are likewise institutionalised. However, the ques-
tion in what way seemingly irrational behaviours are institutionally embedded is usually not raised in
the cognitive strand of behavioural economics. To give an example, experimental research has estab-
lished a diﬀerence between the price oﬀered to buy an item (‘willingness to pay’) and the price
requested to sell it again (‘willingness to accept’), which cannot be rationally explained: the so-
called ‘endowment eﬀect’ (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). This seems to reﬂect the phenom-
enon of ownership, be it ‘psychological’ or ‘legal’ (Reb & Connolly, 2007). But related research in
behavioural economics and economic psychology shows little interest in how ownership is institutio-
nalised and how this institution is internalised by individuals. Given that private property is constitu-
tive for market economies, this is a curious neglect. From a sociological point of view, it seems
plausible to assume that the endowment eﬀect reﬂects prevailing notions of ownership and
cannot simply be boiled down to, say, instinctual territorial behaviour.
Inasmuch as the cognitive strand of behavioural economics is characterised by an implicit or expli-
cit focus on our universal human nature, whereas the cultural contingency of much, if not most, of our
behaviour is not discussed, we can speak of a ‘naturalist bias’. This is the ﬁrst and foremost way in
which the social is truncated in respective scholarship. To compare, the bounded-rationality
approach of old, or alternative, behavioural economics takes a broader perspective on the ‘ecological
rationality of heuristics’ (Gigerenzer, 2016, p. 40). This is characterised by the mutual adaptation of
environment and cognition, ‘without implying that all or even the majority of heuristics represent
evolutionary adaptations’ (Hertwig & Herzog, 2009, p. 668). Instead, heuristics can also be the
result of individual and social learning, which suggests that they can be ‘unlearnt’ as well. Arguably,
this leaves more room for social contingency, which may also be preserved in policy applications.
A second way in which the social is contained in the cognitive strand of behavioural economics is
by reducing it to social inﬂuences in the moment of decision-making. This is in line with a deﬁnition of
bounded rationality in terms of incorrect beliefs and inconsistent choices, while preferences are gen-
erally taken as given and considered as self-regarding. Actual deviations from the self-interest
assumption can then be modelled as situational context eﬀects that ‘bias’ individual decision-
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making. Old behavioural economics seems to take a slightly diﬀerent approach in that social inﬂu-
ences are considered more constitutive. Given ‘that other people often create the most important
aspects of a person’s environment’, ecological rationality naturally includes ‘social heuristics’
(Hertwig & Herzog, 2009, pp. 663 and 680).
A third aspect to be considered is the role that the social plays in behavioural experiments. The
question where cognitive biases stem from may not seem of much relevance if and as long as
they can be replicated in behavioural experiments with many diﬀerent subjects and across
diﬀerent social groups. However, to some extent, this ‘robustness’ may also be an artefact of exper-
imental settings which produce compliant individuals aiming to act in conformity with expectations –
also implicit ones (Böhme, 2016). This caveat concerns experiments in both strands of mainstream
behavioural economics, but might be less reﬂected in the cognitive strand (Henrich, Heine, et al.,
2010, p. 79) than in the social strand (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012, p. 411).
The constitutive role of institutions in promoting economic rationality is acknowledged in the
most prominent political spin-oﬀ of behavioural economics, libertarian paternalism. The very idea
of ‘nudging’ or ‘choice architecture’ (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) is to provide institutional remedies
for irrational behaviours, which are part of human nature. More speciﬁcally, libertarian paternalism
can be understood as a new mode of governance which basically consists in ‘debiasing’ individual
decision-making with the help of regulatory tricks (Jolls & Sunstein, 2006). However, ‘governance
by nudges’ is not just a solution to a problem that would be undeniably given, but it actually
deﬁnes the problem as one of cognitive failure, attributes it to individual human beings, and
oﬀers a technical solution which keeps the market environment intact.
In Mehta’s (2013, p. 1252) terms, this only reveals the ‘historically contingent set of values, beliefs,
attitudes and concerns of the [respective] discourse community’. This worldview presupposes the
institutional and regulatory ideal of rational choice as much as the individualised and normalised
‘reality’ of cognitive biases. Old-style regulation is considered too heavy-handed (Fine, Johnston,
Santos, & Van Waeyenberge, 2016, p. 655), education as hopeless (Gigerenzer, 2015, p. 362), and
genuine empowerment, perhaps, as unwanted (Leggett, 2014, p. 10). And even though one could
argue that the manipulation of choice architecture is as much about shaping individual behaviour
as about changing social institutions, it actually consists in modifying ‘minor’ institutions in order to
safeguard ‘major’ ones (Santos, 2011, p. 715). An example is the regulatory nudge furthering auto-
matic enrolment in retirement saving plans (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, pp. 115–116). By adjusting
certain institutional parameters (e.g. changing the default in employers’ pension plans from ‘opt-
in’ to ‘opt-out’), individual behaviour can be geared towards the challenges of a complex insti-
tutional environment (e.g. a pension system that increasingly rests on private investment rather
than tax revenues), which is taken for granted or considered without alternative. Put diﬀerently,
the market environment is taken positively and normatively as given, while boundedly rational indi-
viduals are equipped with socio-cognitive prostheses enabling them to act ‘in their own best
interest’.
Moreover, where libertarian paternalism explicitly deals with the social, this is reduced to a context
factor among others, which may shape preferences in the moment of decision-making. Accordingly,
Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008, pp. 53–71) ‘social nudges’ work by ‘informing’ the target subjects about
what other people do and think or by ‘priming’ them into the expected behaviour. In other words, the
desire for social conformity is treated as just another form of cognitive bias, which can be induced or
counteracted by subliminal interventions in the choice architecture.
3.2. The long road: the social strand of behavioural economics and its policy implications
Whereas the cognitive strand of behavioural economics is preoccupied with bounded rationality, the
social strand is primarily concerned with bounded self-interest, or the prevalence of other-regarding
preferences. The main approach to studying other-regarding preferences is behavioural game theory,
which diﬀers from analytical game theory in that it draws on experiments and from behavioural
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decision theory in that it focuses on decision-making in interactive situations, such as the ultimatum
game, the dictator game, public goods games with and without punishment, and gift exchange
games. Related scholarship takes issue with the self-interest assumption of the maximisation
approach but usually remains within the consistency approach (Zarri, 2010). Along with recent devel-
opments in sociological rational choice theory, which relax the self-interest assumption to better
account for norm-oriented behaviour, scholars in the social strand of behavioural economics may
allow preferences (1) to be not self-regarding only but also other-regarding, (2) to be not
outcome-oriented only but also process-oriented, and/or (3) to be not exogenously given but
endogenously developed (Bowles & Gintis, 2006, pp. 172–173). The result is a more ‘realistic’
model of man, according to which individuals are not only interested in their own material outcomes
but also in the results of others as well as in the quality of the interaction and their own role in it.
Moreover, preferences are not independent but interdependent within games and can also
change over time as the result of social learning.
In order to distinguish diﬀerent approaches within the social strand of behavioural economics,
time seems to be the decisive factor. One can either assume that social preferences are static or
dynamic. In the ﬁrst case, other-regarding preferences would be considered as stable and given,
just as self-regarding preferences are under the self-interest axiom. If this proposition is taken literally,
it suggests that people are other-regarding by nature. In the second case, preferences can be under-
stood to change in the short run or in the long run. The short-term perspective includes situation-
dependent preferences, which are subject to social framing (referred to as ‘social nudges’ above),
as well as interdependent preferences, meaning that individual decision-makers respond to other
decision-makers’ actions. In this perspective, the social is basically condensed to herding behaviour
and reciprocation strategies. The long-term perspective includes both ‘ontogenetic’models of prefer-
ence formation, which extend to the lifetime of an individual, and ‘phylogenetic’ models, which span
the history of humankind, as well as models of preference development under conditions of market
integration, which can be located somewhere in-between. All these models can be covered in terms
of endogenous preference formation, in which culture has a role to play. But what is dynamic from an
evolutionary point of view, which goes back 1.6 million years (Bowles & Gintis, 2011, p. 17), may seem
static from a political point of view, which aims at economic and social development today (OECD,
2017; World Bank, 2015).
To illustrate, phylogenetic models of gene-culture coevolution may explain how the modern
human species (‘homo sapiens’) came into being and why a propensity to cooperate proved to be
advantageous in the struggle for survival (Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Building on this, Fehr and Gintis
(2007, p. 45) oﬀer a model of society, which ‘not only rejects the selﬁshness assumption routinely
made in economics, but also suggests an alternative view about a basic predisposition of humans:
strong reciprocity’. While this at ﬁrst looks like substituting one thick assumption for another, the
model actually combines the two. More speciﬁcally, Fehr and Gintis (2007, p. 45) distinguish
between two types of actors – ‘rational egoists’ and ‘strong reciprocators’ – whose interaction
‘drives the emergent patterns of social cooperation and social exchange’. This means that human
sociality is ultimately described in terms of the properties and predispositions of individuals again.
However, this ‘unrealistic’ assumption (Bowles, 2016, p. 209) is counterbalanced with institutional
arguments, namely the absence or presence of a ‘punishment opportunity’, which would support
the proliferation of cooperative behaviour (Fehr & Gintis, 2007, p. 50 and 53). While the identiﬁcation
of two diﬀerent types of human beings with ﬁxed, either self- or other-regarding, preferences may
have an ‘essentialising’ eﬀect, the intended lesson of this model seems to be a diﬀerent one: that
‘institutions matter’. A change in the institutional framework can induce the same group or
mixture of people to either free-ride or cooperate, leading to diﬀerent macro-social equilibria (Fehr
& Gintis, 2007, pp. 47–51). Which equilibrium is preferred – the one with more free-riding or the
one with more cooperation – is, ultimately, a political question, or, perhaps, a question of tradition.
In contrast, an ontogenetic perspective on preferences formation would focus on ‘enculturated
actors’ (Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016), whose take on the world develops in the process of socialisation and
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may change with varying life circumstances and social belongings. Hoﬀ and Stiglitz’ (2016) review of
respective studies lays emphasis on ‘deep social determinants’ not only of preferences but also of
perception and cognition, which suggests that our social environment aﬀects not only what we
want but also what we think. Respective scholarship is less interested in individual properties than
in ‘social identities’, which determine who we are and how we make sense of the world: ‘society
creates identities, worldviews, and other mental models that individuals use to process information
and interpret the world’ (Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 36; original emphasis). Instead of cognitive biases,
which everybody is supposed to share, we may speak of cultural lenses, which systematically vary
within and between societies, and which can change or be changed over time. This takes us to
the question of policy implications, or possible interventions in the process of preference and identity
formation. While the models used may still employ the framework of utility maximisation, this does
not suﬃce as a normative benchmark: ‘When utility functions can change as a result of policy, which
utility function should be used?’ (Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 51) What is required is a vision of a ‘good
society’ (Hoﬀ & Stiglitz, 2016, p. 51), which cannot be derived from the modelling strategy as such.
This does not mean that normative guidance is missing in the social strand of behavioural econ-
omics. Most generally, the lesson seems to be that, if preferences are endogenous, politics cannot
hide behind the liberal principle of non-interference, or preference neutrality (Bowles, 2016,
pp. 168–169). Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2016, pp. 49–50) refer to identities and institutions that hinder econ-
omic and social progress as ‘societal rigidities’. Bowles emphasises the contribution of informal social
norms to the functioning of the market economy where its formal rules end (Bowles, 2016, p. 35). This
is against the backdrop of research on the interaction of ‘economic incentives and social preferences’
(Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012). Accordingly, an overreliance on economic incentives may lead to
other-regarding preferences being replaced with self-regarding preferences in the process of ‘prefer-
ence-updating’, or social learning. Bowles (2016, p. 222) concludes that ‘good policies […] are those
that support socially valued ends not only by harnessing self-interest but also by evoking, cultivating,
and empowering public-spirited motives’. Relatedly, evidence from cross-cultural experiments
(Henrich et al., 2005, 2010) is interpreted in terms of the civilising eﬀect of market exchange,
which would further, as well as depend upon, the ‘endogenous evolution of social preferences’
(Bowles & Polanía-Reyes, 2012, p. 410). Bowles’ (2016) view of the ‘moral economy’ has been
linked with ‘neoliberalism as a programme of institutional and individual transformation geared
towards the political and moral promotion of the ideal of market competition’ (Santos & Rodrigues,
2014, p. 521). Taken to this end, the policy implications of the social strand of behavioural economics
would not diﬀer much from the cognitive strand. However, in the social strand taking a realistic
approach to ‘men as they are’ (Bowles, 2016, p. 7) goes along with pointers to social complexity
and contingency, which generally creates space for politics, and does not preclude any alternative
options.
4. Conclusion: behavioural economics between ‘realist fallacy’ and ‘contingency
trap’
This article explored conceptions of the ‘social’ in behavioural economics against the backdrop of two
interrelated projects: to make economics more realistic and to generalise the rational choice
approach. For this purpose, we followed homo economicus through his travels outside his neoclas-
sical homestead: into the borderlands of economics with psychology and sociology.
What we found is that the rational choice approach is still well and alive, but that there is much
experimentation going on with the attributes of economic man, with scholars testing out alternative
thick descriptions, which go beyond both the narrowly conﬁned maximisation approach and the sub-
stantively empty consistency approach. Applications of this model in mainstream behavioural econ-
omics and rational choice sociology frequently qualify the conventional assumptions of rationality
and self-interest, and at times even question the principle of utility maximisation, which practically
changes economic man beyond recognition.
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Our speciﬁc interest was in how this new model man – homo economicus behavioralis – accom-
modates the ‘social’ and what policy implications this may have. Ideally, the diﬀerent variants of this
model can be positioned between the ‘undersocialised’ conception of the classical homo economicus
and the ‘oversocialised’ conception of the classical homo sociologicus (Granovetter, 1985). With
increasing ‘socialisation’ of the economic agent, the analytical focus switches from the decisions of
individuals with given preferences to the preference-shaping function of the context of decision-
making. This includes the immediate context, in which preferences may be evoked or activated by
social cues, as well as the longer-term context, in which individual preferences, or identities,
evolve as the result of social learning.
Closer to the undersocialised pole, the cognitive strand of mainstream behavioural economics
focuses on social inﬂuences in the moment of decision-making, which can be exploited or counter-
acted, just as any other distorting factor. Overall, this yields a rather static vision of behavioural econ-
omic man, whose cognitive biases are considered part of the human condition, which makes it
diﬃcult to meet the rationality norm stipulated in neoclassical economics.
Somewhat higher on the socialisation scale, the economic agent in the social strand may be
conceived as an average or ideal type of the ‘cooperative species’ or even as an enculturated indi-
vidual who learns from others and adapts to diﬀerent social contexts. This oﬀers a more dynamic
vision of behavioural economic man, even though research interests may still vary between
deﬁning man as such and capturing the cultural heterogeneity and variability of human
behaviours.
Regarding the policy implications of the diﬀerent understandings of the social, behavioural
economics seems to be caught between ‘realist fallacy’ and ‘contingency trap’: the tendency to
attribute deviations from rationality to our human nature and ﬁght common biases with social
technologies, instead of questioning larger institutional frameworks, and the risk to open up
too many alternatives which may all seem equally rational and can, as such, only mark the begin-
ning of a political process, instead of oﬀering simple policy recipes to be implemented here and
now.
Against this backdrop, it does not surprise that the social strand of behavioural economics is less
visible in debates about the normative relevance of behavioural ﬁndings, whereas the political impli-
cations of the cognitive strand are widely discussed. Arguably, this diﬀerence directly reﬂects the
observed variance in the social complexity of the underlying models.
Notes
1. Similar distinctions are provided by Hertwig and Herzog (2009, p. 663), who speak of ‘two blows to homo eco-
nomicus: cognitive illusions and other-regarding preferences’, and Santos and Rodrigues (2014, p. 515), who
also explore the policy implications of the two approaches. Hoﬀ and Stiglitz (2016, pp. 28–29) compare two
strands of behavioural economics, one of which focuses on context eﬀects in the moment of decision-
making, while the other emphasises ‘deep’ or ‘durable’ social inﬂuences. Ultimately, it is a question of perspec-
tive whether the distinction between the cognitive and the social strand of behavioural economics is con-
sidered analytically meaningful or not. My impression is that this view is easily shared by representatives of
the social strand (e.g. Bowles, 2016, pp. 7–8), whereas representatives of the cognitive strand may prefer to
speak of extensions of, or additions to, the original heuristics-and-biases programme (Heukelom, 2014,
chapter 6).
2. This subheading is inspired by Lindenberg (2000), who contrasts the ‘thick’ theory of rational egoists with a ‘thick’
understanding of social rationality in a wide reading of the rational choice approach, which harbours both var-
iants (and more).
3. This subheading is inspired by Mullainathan and Thaler (2001, p. 1095), who build their case for libertarian patern-
alism upon ‘three bounds of human nature’ which neoclassical economics neglects: ‘bounded rationality’,
‘bounded willpower’ and ‘bounded self-interest’. In my distinction between the cognitive and the social strand
of behavioural economics, phenomena of bounded rationality (as in situation-dependent choice) and
bounded willpower (as in time-dependent choice) are both regarded as deviations from the rationality assump-
tion, which postulates consistency of choice, whereas phenomena of ‘bounded self-interest’ are considered as
deviations from the self-interest assumption.
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